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Abstract
In this paper we present a dynamic model of cooperative production with human capital
accumulation. We assume CES preferences on consumption and leisure in each period. When
agents do not care about future generations, sustained growth occurs i¤ the elasticity of substi-
tution between consumption and leisure is larger or equal than one. Meritocracy always has a
positive e¤ect on output, but when the elasticity of substitution is less than one, is only a level
e¤ect. When agents care about future generations, under Cobb-Douglas preferences in each
period and some extra conditions, there is constant growth at a rate that is larger than the one
when future generations do not count. For any discount rate between generations, there is a
unique level of meritocracy for which e¢ ciency is achieved.
Keywords: Cooperative Production, Growth, Meritocracy.
JEL classication: D2, D9, O4.
Corresponding author: Carmen Beviá. e-mail: Carmen.bevia@gmail.com
Telephone: +34965903614
Thanks to the MOMA network under the project ECO2014-57673-REDT for nancial support. We beneted
from comments in audiences in seminars in Cincinatti and Davis and by Francesco Turino and two referees. The
rst author acknowledges nancial support from ECO2014 53051, SGR2014-515 and PROMETEO/2013/037. The
second author acknowledges nancial support from ECO2014-57442-P, and nancial support from the Ministerio
Economía y Competitividad (Spain), grants S2015/HUM-3444 and MDM 2014-0431.
1. Introduction
The theory of cooperative production studies an economy in which workers o¤er their labor to a
production center (the coop). The forerunners of this theory were Ward (1958) who imagined an
ideal ("Illyrian") world, Vanek (1970) who focussed on connecting the theory with the cooperative
movement and Sen (1966), who modeled the coop as a sharing rule to distribute the output.1 Later
on, Moulin (1987), Romer and Silvestre (1993)) provided foundations for di¤erent sharing rules. In
this paper, we follow Sens approach. The (impossible) goal of the theory of cooperative production
is to mimic the theory of markets with prot maximizing rms by o¤ering a detailed study of all
the possible outcomes. In this (grand) research picture the theory of cooperative production lags in
dynamic models that illustrate the engines and the consequences of growth. Our paper is addressed
to explore these questions.
Our model is very simple. Agents are identical in all respects: preferences, labor endowments,
and the human capital (capital in the sequel) inherited in the rst period from their ancestors.2
They care about consumption and leisure. Each individual produces her own capital using the
inherited capital and labor. Output is produced by capital and it is distributed according to a
sharing rule. Finally, individuals consume and die, leaving to their successors the human/social
capital they have accumulated.
The coop is composed of a large number of individuals, capital is the product of the inherited
capital and labor, the utility function is CES, the production function has constant elasticity and
the sharing rule is a weighted average of the proportional and the egalitarian sharing rules. There
are 6 parameters in our model:
1. Initial conditions: capital in the initial period.
2. Productivity: the returns to scale in the production of consumption.
3. Degree of meritocracy: the weight of the proportional sharing rule in the sharing rule.
4. Taste for consumption: the weight of consumption versus leisure.
5. Substitutability between consumption and leisure: the elasticity of substitution.
6. Labor endowment.
1 Illyrian has been often used in the literature to represent an ideal world: "Shakespeares Illyria is a fantasy land
of make-believe and illusion" (Shakespeare, p. 169, 1993) or even a scientic Utopia (Beckett, 2003).
2Another interpretation of capital is that refers to social capital, see Dasgupta (2002).
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Our main task will be to identify the role of these variables in the dynamic equilibrium of our
model.
We focus on the case in which, along the equilibrium path, agents make a positive e¤ort. This
is always the case if the elasticity of substitution is less or equal to one. If the elasticity is greater
than one this requires a certain bound on how increasing are the returns to scale.
We start our analysis by considering the limit case in which agents do not care about future
generations. Under Cobb-Douglas preferences (i.e. when the elasticity of substitution equals to
one) we show that capital grows at a constant rate. This rate depends positively on the taste of
consumption and the degree of meritocracy because both encourage e¤ort which in turn produces
more capital.
For any other value of the elasticity of substitution, there is a steady state value of capital. When
the elasticity of substitution is smaller than one (i.e. consumption and leisure are complements),
the steady state is stable, i.e. growth eventually disappears. This is explained by the fact that
consumption is a poor substitute of leisure. So when consumption grows, in order to take full
advantage of this, leisure must grow as well which dampens growth. The value of capital at steady
state depends positively on the degree of meritocracy and the taste of consumption.
If the elasticity of substitution is larger than one (i.e. consumption and leisure are substitutes),
capital at the steady state depends negatively on meritocracy and the taste of consumption. This
may sound paradoxical, but it is explained by the fact that the steady state is now unstable. Thus,
given the initial stock of capital, more meritocracy/taste for consumption may boost the economy
from negative to positive growth. In this case, when human capital grows, leisure is advantageously
replaced by consumption, so unbounded growth is now possible.
We then consider a more general set up in which individuals care about future generations
and they maximize a discounted sum of utilities.3 Due to the technical di¢ culties we focus in the
case in which preferences are Cobb-Douglas. We show that when future generations do not count
much, there is a solution to the intertemporal maximization problem in which the growth rate is
constant. Such a rate does not exist for certain values of the parameters, but when it does, is larger
than the corresponding rate in the zero discounting case. This is due to the fact that when future
counts, there are more incentives to invest in capital which in turn stimulates growth. As before,
3Thus the appoach developed above is a special case in which the discount factor is zero.
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meritocracy encourages work which produces human capital, which makes the economy grow.
Finally, we study e¢ ciency. Too much meritocracy encourages too much work because e¤ort not
only increases the agents capital but increases her share. On the other hand, too little meritocracy
encourages free riding. This suggests that there is an optimal degree of meritocracy and Sen (1966)
proved that this is indeed the case: the optimal degree of meritocracy is achieved when the weight
of the proportional sharing rule equals the elasticity of output with respect to capital. We prove
that Sens result, which corresponds to a static economy without capital accumulation, holds in
our framework.
The role of human capital in models of growth with prot maximizing rms has been stressed
from di¤erent angles. Uzawa (1965) presented the rst model, to the best of our knowledge, in
which human capital played a central role in growth. But it is fair to say that this topic caught re
only after the inuential paper by Lucas (1988). The modern literature is enormous, see Acemoglu
(2008), chapter 10 for a survey. From the empirical point of view, the interest in human capital
stems from the highly inuential paper by Barro (1991) which showed that growth is correlated with
the initial value of human capital. See Lucas (2015) for a new model of the role of human capital
in growth. These models share with ours the assumption that human capital can be accumulated
without bound and without diminishing returns in the production of capital. But as far as we can
tell, there is no correlate in this literature to our results linking preferences and growth because in
all the above models, leisure does not play any role. But constant growth due to human capital is
possible as in our model, see Lucas (1988), pp. 21-25. In the latter, socially optimal and equilibrium
paths diverge, as they do in our model. But there is no "exogenous" variable (the meritocratic
parameter in our model) that can used to minimize welfare losses.
2. The Model and Preliminary Results
Time is countable innite. There are n families (dynasties) with a member alive in each period.
An individual alive in period t from the family i receives from her predecessor a capital of Ht 1i ,
the capital accumulated by the previous generation. We assume that in the rst period, all agents
inherit the same amount of capital, that is, H0i = H
0
j for all i; j. All individuals have the same
endowment of labor time in every period, !: We assume that ! > 1: At time t; each individual
produces her own capital from the inherited capital, Ht 1i ; and her labor, l
t
i 2 [0; !]; in the following
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way
Hti = H
t 1
i l
t
i: (2.1)
Let Ht =
Pn
j=1H
t
j be the aggregate capital at period t. Note that given (2.1), ! > 1 is essential
here to allow for capital growth.
The assumption that human capital is produced by inputs that enter in a multiplicative form
has been used in many models of endogenous growth since the pioneering work of Uzawa (1965),
see e.g. Lucas (1988, p. 18). This multiplicative form has the strong implication that if one of
its terms is zero, it is impossible to produce human capital. A form like Hti = (H
t 1
i + a)(l
t
i + b),
a; b > 0 would be preferable. In this case capital does not fully depreciate even when the e¤ort is
zero. Unfortunately, this formulae does not yield a tractable model. We may think of (2.1) as an
approximation of this more realistic production function when a and b are small.
The consumption good is produced by means of capital represented by the production function
(Ht) : We have decreasing/constant/increasing returns to scale as long as  is less, equal or larger
than one.
The consumption of each individual, cti; is determined by a sharing rule which is written as
follows
cti = (H
t)

1  
n
+ 
Hti
Ht

;  2 [0; 1]: (2.2)
When  = 1 the sharing rule allocates consumption proportional to relative capital and when  = 0
the sharing rule allocates consumption in a totally egalitarian manner. The parameter  is the
weight attached to the relative contribution of a particular agent to the aggregate capital and we
refer to it as the degree of meritocracy. Kang (1988) showed that (2.2) for n > 2, is the unique
di¤erentiable sharing rule which is symmetric and homogeneous of degree zero (i.e. independent
of the units in which capital is measured). Moulin (1987) axiomatized this sharing rule by means
of two properties: additivity (if two agents merge without changing their e¤orts the merged agent
receives the sum of the shares of the two agents) and No-Advantageous Reallocation (agents cannot
increase the sum of their shares by reallocating money inside any coalition). Both properties have
a strong strategic avor.
An individual alive in period t from the family i derives utility from consumption, cti; and leisure,
!   lti; represented by a CES utility function
5
Ui(c
t
i; !   lti) =

(cti)
s 1
s + (!   lti)
s 1
s
 s
s 1
;  > 0; s 2 (0;1): (2.3)
where s is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and labor. When s ! 1, the utility
function is Cobb-Douglas. When s!1 utility is linear in consumption and leisure. When s! 0,
the utility function tends to be Leontie¤. We refer to  as the taste for consumption.
The life of an individual, say i, is simple. She inherits Ht 1i capital and she chooses consumption
and leisure in order to maximize her utility function subject to (2.1), and (2.2). Throughout the
paper, we will assume that when an individual maximizes her utility she takes as given total capital,
Ht. This can be justied when there is a very large number of individuals in the society so when
an individual decides about her investment she disregards these terms. Under this assumption
and (2.1), the restriction (2.2) denes the consumption as a linear function of labor. Thus, the
maximization problem of individual i is simple and becomes
Max(cti;lti) Ui(c
t
i; !   lti)
s:t: cti = (H
t)

1 
n + 
Ht 1i l
t
i
Ht

lti 2 [0; !ti]
(2.4)
We now dene our equilibrium notion.
Denition 1. A short run equilibrium (SRE) in period t is a list f(~cti; ~lti)gni=1; such that for any
agent i, (~cti; ~l
t
i) is a solution to the maximization problem (2.4) taking ~H
t as given and ~Ht =Pn
j=1H
t 1
j
~ltj :
We close this section showing that at each period t the short run equilibrium exists and is
symmetric, and under certain conditions on the parameters of the model, the equilibrium is interior.
We o¤er the formal proofs of these preliminary results in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. At every t; a short run equilibrium exists, is unique and symmetric.
That a short run equilibrium exists, is a direct consequence of the continuity of the utility as a
function of lti given that, c
t
i = (H
t)

1 
n + 
Ht 1i l
t
i
Ht

and the domain is a compact set (lti 2 [0; !]).
At period 1, all agents inherit the same capita, H0i ; and all have the same endowment of labor time.
Since they take H1 as given, all of them face the same maximization problem which has a unique
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solution and, therefore, they choose the same amount of labor time. Consequently, the inherited
capital in period 2 is also the same for all agents, and so on. In each period, all agents inherit the
same capital.
Proposition 2. If ( s 1s ) < 1 and  > 0, the short run equilibrium is interior, i.e. ~l
t
i 2 (0; !) for
all i:
This condition holds under constant returns to scale ( = 1), or if the utility function is Cobb-
Douglas, or if s < 1. But if s > 1, returns to scale must be su¢ ciently decreasing. Note that if
 = 0 agents expect their income to come entirely from the aggregate capital which, by assumption,
does not change with the e¤orts of a single player. Thus they make zero e¤ort.
3. Equilibrium paths
Along this section we assume that ( s 1s ) < 1 and  > 0 which guarantees that the equilibrium is
interior.
In order to analyze the equilibrium it is useful to consider the Lagrange function associated to
(2.4),
Ui(c
t
i; !   lti)  ti

cti   (Ht)

1  
n
+ 
Ht 1i l
t
i
Ht

where ti is the Lagrange multiplier. Since we assume that the parameters of the model are such
that the equilibrium is interior, the rst order conditions give us the maximum.
@Ui(c
t
i; !   lti)
@cti
= ti.
@Ui(c
t
i; !   lti)
@lti
=  ti
(Ht)Ht 1i
Ht
:
Denoting the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure as Mi(cti; !   lti) we
have that
Mi(c
t
i; !   lti) =
Ht
Ht 1i (Ht)
: (3.1)
For a CES utility function, we have that
Mi(c
t
i; !   lti) = 

!   lti
cti
 1
s
: (3.2)
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Combining (3.1) and (3.2),
lti = !  

(Ht)1 
Ht 1i
s
cti: (3.3)
Since all individuals are identical, in an interior symmetric equilibrium, Ht 1i = H
t 1
j ; H
t
i = H
t
j ;
Ht 1 = nHt 1i ; H
t = nHti : Thus, l
t
i = H
t
i=H
t 1
i = H
t=Ht 1; and cti = (H
t)=n: From (3.3),
Ht
Ht 1
= !   ns 1

1
Ht 1
s
(Ht)s(1 )+ : (3.4)
We will refer to (3.4) as the transition function, that denes an equilibrium path of the human
capital.
We start analyzing the case of a linear transition function.
3.1. Equilibrium paths with a linear transition function
The transition function is linear i¤ the utility function is Cobb-Douglas. In this case, the transition
(3.4) can be written as:
Ht =
!
1 + 
Ht 1:
The growth rate is given by
gt =
Ht  Ht 1
Ht 1
=
!
1 + 
  1: (3.5)
The growth rate is constant, and it is positive i¤ (! 1) > 1. It increases with labor endowments
(so countries rich in endowments tend to grow faster than countries poor in endowments); in the
taste of consumption (so consumerism is good for growth because incentivizes hard work) and
the degree of meritocracy (meritocracy encourages hard work). Returns to scale () do not play
any role. As noted before, full egalitarianism ( = 0) destroys the whole economy in a single
period!. Since Ht=Ht 1 = lti; g
t = lti   1 and from (3.5) we see that each individual makes an e¤ort
proportional (=(1 + )) to her endowment of labor time. This proportion increases with the
taste of consumption and the degree of meritocracy.
3.2. Equilibrium paths with a non linear transition function
When s 6= 1; the transition function has a unique xed point, H^, di¤erent from zero given by
H^ =
 
!   1
ns 1( 1)s
! 1
(1 s)
: (3.6)
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Note that the assumption that ! > 1 implies that the xed point is positive.
The following propositions states the properties of the transition function around H^: The formal
proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 3. The unique xed point, H^, is globally stable i¤ s < 1. Furthermore, if s < 1; H^
is increasing with !, , and :
When s < 1 growth nally ends and we converge to a stationary society in which the human
capital H^ is increasing in !,  and in the level of meritocracy. This is because when s < 1
consumption is a poor substitute of leisure. So when consumption grows, in order to take full
advantage of this, leisure must grow as well which eventually exhausts growth.
Proposition 4. If s > 1 the unique xed point, H^, is unstable. Furthermore, if s > 1; H^ is
decreasing with !, , and : If H0 < H^; capital always decreases. Otherwise capital always
increases, and when t!1, gt ! !   1:
The case s > 1 in the long run is somehow similar to the Cobb-Douglas case, in particular, in
the limit, the growth rate is independent of the returns to scale. But there are striking similarities.
Neither the taste of consumption nor the degree of egalitarianism play any role whatsoever in the
determination of the long run growth rate, even though they play a role in the determination of
H^ and therefore in the fact that the economy grows positively or negatively. The possibility of a
positive growth depends on H^ to be small! This explains the, apparently paradoxical comparative
statics results, that when s > 1; H^ is decreasing in !,  and . This is because high initial
endowments (or taste for consumption or meritocracy) make H^ small and thus it is more likely
that growth is positive! Notice that in the limit gt ' !   1 and, given that gt = lti   1; leisure
disappears in the limit. This is due to the fact that consumption and leisure are very substitutable,
i.e. s > 1.
Finally, we note that the same assumptions that yield intuitive comparative static results yield
stability. This is a familiar situation since Samuelson advanced the Correspondence Principle
(1941), namely that most assumptions that are su¢ cient to insure stability of equilibrium turn out
to be very useful when doing comparative statics (and uniqueness).
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4. Dynasties
The previous approach does not take into account that individuals may care about future genera-
tions. Thus, when choosing labor they disregard the e¤ect of todays labor on tomorrows capital.
In this section we consider a model in which each agent maximizes a utility function which is the
innite sum of discounted utility (at rate ) namely
Wi =
t=1P
t=1
t 1U(cti; !   lti): (4.1)
Now, when an individual decides on todays e¤ort takes into account todays and tomorrows impact
of this e¤ort.
Equilibrium arises from the maximization of (4.1) with the following set of constraints
cti = (H
t)

1  
n
+ 
Hti
Ht

; t 2 f1; 2; :::g
Hti = H
t 1
i l
t
i; t 2 f1; 2; :::g; H0i > 0.
Or equivalently,
cti = (H
t)

1  
n
+ 
H0i 
t
T=1l
T
i
Ht

; t 2 f1; 2::::g; H0i > 0:
Let ti be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint at time t. First order conditions
of maximization for cti and l
1
i yield
@U(cti; !   lti)
@cti
t 1 = ti; t 2 f1; 2::::g
 @U(c
1
i ; !   l1i )
@l1i
= 
 
1i
(Ht)H0i
H1
+
1X
t=2
ti
(Ht)H0i 
t
T=2l
T
i
Ht
!
;
lim
T!1
T 1
@U(cTi ; !   lTi )
@lti
HTi = 0: (4.2)
Where (4.2) is the transversality condition. Combining the rst two equations,
 1

@U(c1i ; !   l1i )
@l1i
=
@U(c1i ; !   l1i )
@c1i
(H1) 1H0i + (4.3)
+
1X
t=2
t 1
@U(cti; !   lti)
@cti
(Ht) 1H0i 
t
T=2l
T
i :
Given the complexity of the di¤erence equations that characterize the optimum, we will assume
that the utility function is Cobb-Douglas, namely Ui(cti; !  lti) = (cti)

1+ (!ti  lti)
1
1+ ;  > 0. Thus,
@U(cti;! lti)
@cti
 @U(c1i ;! l1i )
@l1i
=
(cti)
 1
1+ (!   lti)
1
1+
(c1i )

1+ (!   l1i )
 
1+
: (4.4)
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Dividing (4.3) by  @U(c1i ; !   l1i )=@l1i and using (4.4) we obtain
1

=
(!   l1i )
(c1i )
(H1) 1H0i +
+
1X
t=2
t 1
(cti)
 1
1+ (!   lti)
1
1+
(c1i )

1+ (!   l1i )
 
1+
(Ht) 1H0i 
t
T=2l
T
i : (4.5)
In an interior symmetric equilibrium, lti = H
t=Ht 1; and cti = (H
t)=n: Thus, substituting in (4.5)
and simplifying we get:
1

= (!   H
1
H0
)
H0
H1
+
+
1X
t=2
t 1
(Ht)
  
1+ (!   Ht
Ht 1 )
1
1+
(H1)

1+ (!   H1
H0
)
 
1+
(Ht) 1H0tT=2
HT
HT 1
: (4.6)
Inspired by the case in which  = 0, we conjecture that when  > 0 and the utility function is
Cobb-Douglas, human capital would grow at a constant rate, at least if  is small. Our method
of proof here is the familiar "propose and check", i.e., we propose a certain solution and we show
that this solution fullls the necessary and su¢ cient conditions of an equilibrium. For a constant
growth rate to be a solution, G = Ht=Ht 1 for all t should satisfy (4.6) and the transversality
condition. This implies that G should be a solution of
G(1 + )  G 1++1 = !: (4.7)
The following proposition gives the conditions under which this equation has a solution. It happens
that, when (4.7) has a solution, it has one or two of them, the constant growth rate solution to
our problem is the smallest one when there are two. Formal details of the proofs are given in the
Appendix.
Proposition 5. If the utility function is Cobb-Douglas:
i) There is constant growth rate i¤ 
1 + 

1+ + 1
! 1+

+1
  1+ !(1 + )

:
ii) The growth rate is given by the smallest solution to the equation
G(1 + )  G 1++1 = !:
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The necessary and su¢ cient condition holds for  su¢ ciently small. In particular, it always
holds when  = 0; and the growth rate coincides with the growth rate obtained with the linear
transition function in Section 3, namely !=(1+): Finally, we show in the following proposition
how the constant growth rate varies with the parameters of the model.
Proposition 6. The growth rate is increasing in !;  and the level of meritocracy : If G > 1, the
growth rate is also increasing in .
Summing up, the introduction of the future in the plans of agents has several important con-
sequences. First, the dynamics become extremely complex. Second, in the Cobb-Douglas case, for
a su¢ ciently small ; there is a solution to the intertemporal maximization problem in which the
growth rate is constant. Such a rate does not exist for certain values of the parameters, but when
it does, is larger than the corresponding rate in the zero discounting case. This is due to the fact
that when future counts, there are more incentives to invest in capital which in turn stimulates
growth. The role of meritocracy is identical to the case  = 0. Meritocracy encourages work which
produces human capital, which makes the economy grow. For  > 0 returns to scale does play a
role. The larger they are, the larger is the growth rate.
5. E¢ ciency
We turn our attention to the relationship between e¢ ciency and equilibrium. Sen (1966) proved in
a static model without capital that equilibrium and e¢ ciency can be reconciled by setting  = .
The intuition is that, on the one hand an egalitarian sharing rule gives incentives to work very little.
On the other hand, meritocracy gives incentives to work more than it is socially e¢ cient because
an increase in work, not only means more production, it also means that the share of the labour
of the person doing this extra e¤ort increases. Thus, by balancing egalitarianism and meritocracy,
e¢ ciency is achieved. We now investigate if Sens result holds in our model. In this section we will
assume that   1.4
We say that an intertemporal allocation f(~cti; ~lti; ~Hti )g1t=1 is feasible if for all t;
Pn
i=1ur ~c
t
i = (
~Ht) ;
and for all i, ~lti 2 [0; !] and ~Hti = ~Ht 1i ~lti.
4Since our method of proof is looking at rst order conditions, we need   1 to make sure that they characterize
the e¢ cient allocation.
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Denition 2. A feasible intertemporal allocation f(~cti; ~lti; ~Hti )g1t=1 is Pareto e¢ cient if there is no
other feasible intertemporal allocation in which all agents are better o¤.
It is well known that if utility functions and the production function are concave, a Pareto
E¢ cient allocation maximizes the weighted sum of utilities (for some weights) under the feasible
set. With this fact in hand, we state the following result whose proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 7. For all   0; the equilibrium is Pareto e¢ cient i¤  = :
Thus, Sens result is robust in the sense that it holds in a dynamic world with capital. Un-
fortunately, his original result is heavily dependent on the assumption that utility functions are
identical. Working independently, Beviá and Corchón (2009) and Moulin (2010) proved that when
individuals have di¤erent tastes, a completely di¤erent sharing rule has to be used. Furthermore,
the production function must be polynomial.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a model of accumulation of human/social capital in a cooperative. The
model has interesting features like the existence of a constant growth rate in the case of Cobb-
Douglas preferences (dynastic or not) and the possibility of accelerated growth when the elasticity
of substitution is larger than one and agents do not care about future generations. We show that by
equating the weight of meritocracy in the sharing rule to the elasticity of production with respect
to human capital, the intertemporal allocation of resources is e¢ cient.
We hope that our paper, which, to the best of our knowledge is the rst to deal with growth of
cooperatives, stimulates more research in this area.
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7. APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Given that lti 2 [0; !], and cti = (Ht)

1 
n + 
Ht 1i l
t
i
Ht

; Ui(c
t
i; !   lti)
is a continuous function of lti; and therefore a maximum exists. In fact, this maximum is unique
because the second order condition of utility maximization is
@2Ui
@(cti)
2
@cti
@lti
+
@Ui
@cti
@2cti
@(lti)
2
+
@2Ui
@(lti)
2
(7.1)
where
cti = (H
t)

1  
n
+ 
Ht 1i l
t
i
Ht

: (7.2)
Given that
@cti
@lti
= Ht 1i (H
t) 1 (7.3)
and that we assume that when individuals maximize they take aggregate capital as given, the
second term in (7.1) is zero. Given that the utility function is CES, the rst term and the third
term are negative. Thus, the maximum is unique. Finally, note that at period 1 all agents inherit
the same human capital, H0i = H
0
j ; and since agents maximize taking aggregate capital as given,
the maximization at time 1 is the same for all agents. Given that the maximization has a unique
solution, equilibrium at t = 1 is symmetric, which implies that all agents in period 2 inherit the
same human capital. Therefore, the equilibrium is also symmetric in period 2 and in any other
subsequent period.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Let us see rst that ~lti < !: Given that c
t
i = (H
t)

1 
n + 
Ht 1i l
t
i
Ht

; and agents take Ht as
given, it is su¢ cient to show that
@Ui
@cti
@cti
@lti
+
@Ui
@lti
< 0 when lti ! !; (7.4)
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that is, 
(cti)
s 1
s + (!   lti)
s 1
s
 1
s 1

(cti)
  1
s
@cti
@lti
  (!   lti) 
1
s

< 0 when lti ! !: (7.5)
When lti ! !; both cti and @c
t
i
@lti
are strictly positive.
If s > 1;to require (7.5) is equivalent to require that
lim
lti!!

(cti)
  1
s
@cti
@lti
  (!   lti) 
1
s

< 0: (7.6)
Since 1s > 0; (7.6) holds for i independently of what other individuals do.
If s < 1; we can write (7.5) as A+B where
A =

(cti)
s 1
s + (!   lti)
s 1
s
 1
s 1

(cti)
  1
s
@cti
@lti

; and (7.7)
B =  

(cti)
s 1
s + (!   lti)
s 1
s
 1
s 1
(!   lti) 
1
s : (7.8)
Since both, cti and
@cti
@lti
; are strictly positive when lti ! !; and limlti!!

(cti)
s 1
s + (!   lti)
s 1
s
 1
s 1
=
0; limlti!! A = 0: Furthermore, B can be written as
B =  
 


cti
!   lti
 s 1
s
+ 1
! 1
s 1
=
=  
0@ 1
(
! lti
cti
)
1 s
s + 1
1A 11 s
For s < 1; limlti!! B =  1 and therefore, (7.4) holds.
Finally, when s! 1; the utility function is Cobb-Douglas, that is
Ui(c
t
i; !   lti) = (cti)

1+ (!ti   lti)
1
1+ ;  > 0: (7.9)
Let us see that, also in this case, (7.4) holds because it can be written as

1 + 
(cti)
 1
1+ (!ti   lti)
1
1+
@cti
@lti
  1
1 + 
(cti)

1+ (!ti   lti)
 
1+ : (7.10)
When lti ! !; the rst term converges to zero and the second term converges to  1. Consequently,
(7.4) holds.
Thus, for any s 2 (0;1); in equilibrium ~lti < !:
16
Secondly, let us show under which conditions lti = 0 for all i is not an equilibrium. To show
that is enough to prove that when ltj = 0 for all j 6= i;
@Ui
@cti
@cti
@lti
+
@Ui
@lti
> 0 when lti ! 0; (7.11)
that is, 
(cti)
s 1
s + (!   lti)
s 1
s
 1
s 1

(cti)
  1
s
@cti
@lti
  (!   lti) 
1
s

> 0 when lti ! 0: (7.12)
If s > 1;to require (7.12) is equivalent to require that
(cti)
  1s @c
t
i
@lti
> ! 
1
s when lti ! 0: (7.13)
By plugging (7.2) and (7.3) stated in the proof of Proposition 1 into (7.13), we get,


1  
n
  1
s
Ht 1i (H
t)(
s 1
s
) 1 > ! 
1
s (7.14)
Thus if ( s 1s ) < 1 and  > 0; when l
t
i ! 0; Hti ! 0 and (7.11) holds.
If s < 1;we can write (7.12) as A + B as in (7.7) and (7.8). Note that limlti !0 B = 0; and A
can be written as
A =

 + (
!   lti
cti
)
s 1
s
 1
s 1


@cti
@lti

=
=
0@ 1
 + (
cti
! lti
)
1 s
s
1A 11 s @cti
@lti

:
The rst term converges to

1

 1
1 s
when lti ! 0 because and the second term converges to zero
if  > 1; converges to +1 if  < 1; and to Ht 1i if  = 1: In any case, limlti !0 A  0 and (7.11)
holds.
Finally, when s ! 1; the utility function is Cobb-Douglas as in (7.9). Let us see that, also in
this case, (7.11) holds because it can be written as in (7.10) where the second term converges to
zero when lti ! 0; and the rst term converges to zero if ( 1+ )   1 > 0; and converges to +1 if
( 1+ )  1 < 0: In any case, (7.11) holds.
Summarizing, if ( s 1s ) < 1 and  > 0, the short run equilibrium is interior
Proof of Proposition 3. The transition function (3.4) can be written implicitly as
(Ht 1;Ht) =
Ht
Ht 1
  ! + ns 1

1

s
(Ht 1) s(Ht)s(1 )+ = 0:
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Clearly, at (H^; H^) we have that (H^; H^) = 0: Furthermore, @(H^; H^)=@Ht > 0 because,
@(Ht 1;Ht)
@Ht
=
1
Ht 1
+ (s(1  ) + )ns 1

1

s
(Ht 1) s(Ht)s(1 )+ 1;
and s(1  ) +  > 0 given that ( s 1s ) < 1: Thus, @(Ht 1;Ht)=@Ht > 0 for any (Ht 1;Ht) in a
rectangular domain 
  R2+: Therefore,
@Ht
@Ht 1
=
Ht
(Ht 1)2 + sn
s 1

1

s
(Ht 1) s 1(Ht)s(1 )+
1
Ht 1 + (s(1  ) + )ns 1

1

s
(Ht 1) s(Ht)s(1 )+ 1
;
which implies that Ht is an increasing function of Ht 1 in any rectangular domain:
Finally, let us see that
 @Ht@Ht 1 H^ < 1 if and only if s < 1: Note that  @Ht@Ht 1 H^ < 1 if and only if
1
H^
+ sns 1

1

s
(H^)(1 s) 1 <
1
H^
+ (s(1  ) + )ns 1

1

s
(H^)(1 s) 1;
that is, if and only if, s < 1: Furthermore, since Ht is an increasing function of Ht 1; with a unique
xed point, the xed point is also globally stable.
That H^ is increasing with !, , and  when s < 1 follows directly from (3.6).
Proof of Proposition 4. Instability when s > 1 follows from Proposition 3. That H^ is
decreasing with !, , and  when s > 1 follows directly from (3.6). In order to show the last part
of the proposition, note that the transition function can be written as
Ht
Ht 1
+ ns 1

1

s
(
Ht
Ht 1
)s(Ht)(1 s) = !:
Which in terms of the growth rate, 1 + gt = Ht=Ht 1; can be written as follows
1 + gt + ns 1

1

s
(1 + gt)s(Ht)(1 s) = !: (7.15)
The left hand side of (7.15) is increasing in gt but decreasing in Ht because s > 1. Therefore, if
Ht > Ht 1 then gt > gt 1. Thus, if H0 > H^; when t!1, Ht !1; and
lim
t!1(1 + g
t) ' !;
which implies that gt tends to !   1:
In the proof of Proposition 5 we use Berge maximum theorem (Berge 1963). For completeness,
we recall the version of the theorem that we are using here.
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Berge maximum theorem (Berge 1963). Let E and Y be topological spaces. If u :
E  Y ! R is a continuous real-valued function and Y is a compact set, Then the correspondence
M : E ! 2Y dened for each e 2 E as
M(e) = fy 2 Y : u(e; y)  u(e; x);8x 2 Y g
is upper hemi-continuous.
Proof of Proposition 5.
(i) If there is a constant growth rate, 1 + g = Ht=Ht 1 for all t: Let G = 1 + g: Thus, Ht =
H0(G)t: Note that (G)t means G at the power of t; abusing notation and whenever no confusion
arrives, we denote G at the power of t as Gt: Using (4.6), G should be a solution of the following
equation:
1

= (!  G) 1
G
+
+
1X
t=2
t 1
(Gt)
  
1+ (!  G)
(H0)(G)

1+
(Gt) 1(H0)Gt 1;
or equivalently,
1

= (!  G) 1
G
 
1 +
1
(G)

1+
1X
t=2

G

1+
t!
: (7.16)
We need to make sure that the sum in the above equation is nite. If the growth rate is constant,
the transversality condition in the optimum implies that,
lim
T!1
 T 1
  
H0G
T

n
! 
1+ H0G
T
n
(!  G)  1+ = 0;
lim
T!1
 H

+1
+1
0
n

+1
+1
(!  G)  1+ (G +1+1)T = 0:
Thus, the transversality condition implies that G

+1
+1
< 1; which also implies that G

+1 < 1
(because if G

+1  1 will imply G  1 and therefore G +1+1  1) : Then, (7.16) becomes
1

= (!  G) 1
G
(
1
1  G 1+
):
Arranging terms,
G(1 + )  G 1++1 = !: (7.17)
Any constant growth rate must be a solution of (7.17).
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Note that when  = 0; the growth rate coincides with the growth rate obtained with the linear
transition function in Section 3, namely !=(1 + ):
For  > 0; let us see under which conditions a solution to (7.17) exists.
The derivative of the left hand side of (7.17) with respect to G is 1 +    ( 1+ + 1)G

1+ ;
which has the following properties: 1) It is zero for a unique value of G, namely
G^ =
0@ 1 + 

1+ + 1


1A
1+

:
2) For values of G less (resp. more) than this value the left hand side of (7.17) is increasing (resp.
decreasing) with respect to G: Therefore, the left hand side of (7.17) is strictly concave with respect
to G . Note that (7.17) has a solution if and only if the left hand side of (7.17) evaluated at G^ is
greater or equal than !; that is,
 
1 + 

1+ + 1
! 1+

+1
  1+ !(1 + )

: (7.18)
(ii) Note that the left hand side of (7.17) is strictly concave on G because the second derivative
is negative. Thus, generically, there are two values of G which solve this equation. We will end this
proof by showing that only the smallest root is a solution to our problem.
Note that the one period utility function can be written as
Ui((H
t)(
1  
n
+ 
Hti
Ht
); !   H
t
i
Ht 1i
):
Let us write the previous equation as V (Ht 1i ;H
t
i ;H
t). Given that we are assuming that the growth
rate of human capital is constant, the intertemporal utility function can be written as
Wi(;G) =
1P
t=1
t 1V (Ht 1i ;H
t
i ;H
t) = F (;H0i ;H
0
i G;H
0
i G
2; :::::; H1;H2; ::::)
in which agents choose (a constant) G. Applying Berge maximum theorem where Y = [0; !];
E = [0; 1]; G 2 [0; !]; and  2 [0; 1]; we now that the correspondence
G() = fG 2 [0; !]=Wi(;G) Wi(;G0);8G0 2 [0; !]g
has to be upper hemi-continuous.
We know that at  = 0; the solution is such that G < G^ (this is the case where the equation
(7.17) only has one solution). If for some s the maximum root of (7.17) were a solution, then it
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can be proved that the correspondence G() will fail to be upper hemi-continuous, contradicting
Berge theorem.
Proof of Proposition 6. Recall that, since lti < !; G < !: Let us write (7.17) asH(G;!; ; ; ) =
0: Then,
@G
@!
=  
@H
@!
@H
@G
=

@H
@G
;
@G
@
=  
@H
@
@H
@G
=
G

1+
+1
@H
@G
;
@G
@
=  
@H
@
@H
@G
=
(!  G)
@H
@G
;
@G
@
=  
@H
@
@H
@G
=
( 1+ + 1)G

1+ 
1+ lnG
@H
@G
:
In the proof of Proposition 5 we have shown that for all G < G^; @H@G > 0: Thus, the proposition
follows.
Proof of Proposition 7. A useful characterization of e¢ ciency in this case can be stated as
follows: A feasible intertemporal allocation f(~cti; ~lti; ~Hti )g1t=1 is Pareto e¢ cient if there exist a list
(1; 2; :::n) with i  0 for all i; such that,
f(~cti; ~lti; ~Hti )g1t=1 2 argmax
Pn
i=1 i
1P
t=1
t 1U(cti; !   lti):
s:t:
Pn
i=1 c
t
i = (H
t) ; t 2 f1; 2; :::g
Hti = H
0
i 
t
T=1l
T
i ; t 2 f1; 2; :::g; i 2 f1; ::; ng
H0i > 0 ; i 2 f1; ::; ng
Now Lagrange multipliers have a time super index and the lagrange function is given by
nX
i=1
i
1P
t=1
t 1U(cti; !   lti) +
1P
t=1
t(
nX
i=1
cti   (Ht)) +
nX
i=1
1P
t=1
ti(H
t
i  H0i tT=1lTi ):
FOC are
i
t 1@U(cti; !   lti)
@cti
+ t = 0; (7.19)
i
@U(c1i ; !   l1i )
@l1i
  1iH0i  
1P
t=1
tiH
0
i 
t
T=2l
T
i = 0; (7.20)
 t(Ht) 1 + ti = 0: (7.21)
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From (7.21) ti = 
t(Ht) 1; and from (7.19), ti =  it 1 @U(c
t
i;! lti)
@cti
(Ht) 1: Thus, (7.21) can
be written as:
i
@U(c1i ; !   l1i )
@l1i
+i
@U(c1i ; !   l1i )
@c1i
(H1) 1H0i +
1P
t=2
i
t 1@U(cti; !   lti)
@cti
(Ht) 1H0i 
t
T=2l
T
i = 0;
or equivalently,
 1

@U(c1i ; !   l1i )
@l1i
=
@U(c1i ; !   l1i )
@c1i
(H1) 1H0i +
1P
t=2
t 1
@U(cti; !   lti)
@cti
(Ht) 1H0i 
t
T=2l
T
i (7.22)
Comparing (7.22) with (4.3), namely
 1

@U(c1i ; !   l1i )
@l1i
=
@U(c1i ; !   l1i )
@c1i
(H1) 1H0i +
1X
t=2
t 1
@U(cti; !   lti)
@cti
(Ht) 1H0i 
t
T=2l
T
i ;
we see that they are identical when  =  and it is independent on :
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